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INFLUX CONTROL, THE COLOUR BAR, MINIMUM WAGE UGISLATION 
AM) TB lUKNLNGS GAP IN SOUTII: KFRICA 
W. S. Siebert 
This paper aims to analyse the factors contributing to low African relative 
pay in mining and private manufacturing and construction (PMS) , arnd to indicate how 
these factors are related to policies chosen to advance white economic interests. 
The hope is to cast light on the following questions: What effect has the Wage Board 
had on the earnings gap? Have African trade unions raised African wage rates? How 
has the colour bar changed over time - in particular, has the pressure of post-war 
full employment tended to break it down? To what extent have the pass laws tended to 
widen the earnings gap? 
The white to African average earnings ratio, the "earnings gapn, depends by 
definition on the relative skill composition of the two groups. It also depends on 
the structure of pay given the job, that is to say the spread of pay between skilled 
and unskilled jobs, i.e. the "skill marginff, and differences in pay between whites 
and Africans in a given job (wage discrimination). 
The structure of pay mi&t be affected by the level of business activity. 
It mi&t also be affected by institutional factors. Thus it is is possible that the 
Wage Board and the Central Bantu Labour Board (cBLB) have on occasions raised the pay 
of unskilled workers relative to skilled. There is also the possibility that influx 
control will affect skill margins by reducing the relative rate of increase of African 
wage rates in economic expansion. As for relative skill composition, this is probably 
affected by the level of hsbess activity, e.g. because there is a tendency to 
upgrade Africans in upswing conversely. It is also likely to be affected by the 
colour bar (which prevents Africans being upgraded relative to whites in industrial 
work), by influx control (which makes their training less worthwhile) and by schooling 
policy. The very poor schooling of Africans relative 'to whites is likely to make 
African job opportunities less favourable, even without discrimination in hiring. 
We take in turn the economic forces acting on relative African pay and 
i) the Wage Board, Industrial Councils and African trade unions; 
ii) influx control; 
iii) the colour bar and education policy. 
In the last section these strands are brought together. To save space, discussion 
and documentation have been limited. 
The Warn Board, Industrial Councils and African Trade Unions 
Speaking generally, wage minima are set by the Wage Board in industries 
where whites are not organized. Industrial Councils consisting of employers and 
representatives of non-African workers set minimum wages in industries where whites 
are organized. 
It is probably fair to say that the Wage Board sets the pace for industrial 
councils in the setting of wage rates for unskilled (i.e. mainly ~frican) jobs. 
Since 1930 a Department of Labour official has sat in on Council meetings when 
African wages are discussed, and since 1953 the CBLB has sent representatives to 
meetings. The Wage Board is final arbitrator when the CBLB cannot settle African 
disputes. Gazetting of Agreements can be, and has been, withheld until unskilled 
wages rates are raised to Wage Board levels. (1) Hence we can treat these two m s  
of the wage-setting machinery as one. 
Official policy on the setting of unskilled rates has probably been much 
affected by African trade union and political activity. It can be summarized as 
follows. Prior to 1937 minimum rates had to be geared to "civilized" levels, and 
hence were not applied to Africans. After 1937, and especially during the war, 
minimum rates were raised for unskilled work in urban industry outside, with one 
exception, mining - see Table 1. The exception in mining wss the Mine Natives' Wages 
Commission award in 1944. In particular, government-set cost of living allo~ces 
(introduced in 1942) were raised much more for low paid than high paid workers. (2) 
There was a g~eat increase in African trade union membership at this time, reaching 
a peak of perhaps 160 thousand ( 3 ) ,  and many instances of African trade union 
representations to the Wage Board. 
Unskilled minimum rates seem to have continued to be raised until the 
early 1950s - see Table 2 - and again we can see African pressures, e.g. the 1950 
riots on the Rand. Then, from 1953 to 1957 there was hardly any movement because, 
D. Purse11 has said, of government "uncertainty" as to whether to increase white 
wages or African. (4) A more likely reason is that over this period African trade 
unions were disarray, for example,owing to the Suppression of Communism Act. By 1958 
a survey showed only twenty thousand Africans in trade unions. (5) Renewed Wage 
Board activity in 1957 coincided with the Alemdra bus boycott and continued until 
1964-65, despite a marked recession in the early 1960s. Here again we can look to 
African political activity (~harpeville in 1960, Paarl in 1962) and trade union 
activity - membership rose to a peak of seventy-one thousand in 1961 (6) before 
falling away in the mid-1960s. 
How do we distinguish the effect of wage setting policy on African pay 
relative to white? There is, in fact, a close association between yearly changes in 
unskilled minimum wage rates, At, and changes in average African earnings rates in 
PMC, fiA . (7) This need not mean, however, that minimum wage setting has 
indepeniently affected African wages. If, say, the labour market is tight, the 
official "payability" criterion is more likely to be met (because profits are likely 
to be high or rising or both) and minima will be more readily raised. Yet this is 
also the time when employers will be short of labour and, in a competitive market, 
will be bidding wages up. 
Certainly, however, this argument will not hold at times of hi& 
unemployment. If African wage rates rise then, and the Wage Board is hown to have 
been active, the implication is that minimum wage setting is the cause. Moreover, 
this argument will not hold (whatever the level of unemployment) at times when 
labour bureau control over African labour allocation is strong, for then employers 
will tend not to resort to wage competition to obtain African labour. This has 
probably been the case since the setting up of bureaux in 1949 (see next section). 
Thus it is possible that the observed post-war association between increases in 
unskilled wage minima and African earnings increases does illustrate the causal role 
of government minimum wage setting. 
There remains the point as to whether the raising of African wage rates 
need be accompanied by similar white wage increases. An examination by F. van den 
Bogaerde of the wage stmture in Iron and Steel (employing about 20 per cent of the 
manufacturing labour force), however, has shown that while there is a firm relation 
over the between the earnings rates of the various white worker g~ades, there is 
not - perhaps because of "social distance", or the difference in the jobs performed - 
between white and African grades. (8) Thus it seems that a rise in unskilled p w  
need not be followed by a rise in skilled, that is to say the Wage Board can compress 
skill margins. 
Influx Control 
Labour bureaux set up since 1949 attempt to ensure that workers classified 
under section 10 (1) d of the Urban Areas Act (i.e. not qualified by birth or long 
residence to remain in the urban area) remain '%emporary sojourners", working under 
fixed-tern contracts in the urban areas, Le. l'contractll workers. The policy has 
long been to limit the urban African population to the "economic needs" of the urban 
areas, and to remove unemployed or "redundantt1 Africans. But it proved llimpossiblew(g) 
to prevent the movement of Africans off the reserves and, to a lesser extent, the 
white farms (though movement out of mining was largely ruled out since most mine- 
workers were foreign). With the establishment of bureaux, however, a potentially 
effective means came into action for limiting the African inflow and endorsing out 
 undesirable^^^, including the unemployed. The coverage of bureaux is shown in Table 3. 
Labour bureaux are likely to reduce voluntary mobility of Africans, 
particularly "contract1' workers, between firms in the urban areas. This is to be 
expected partly because Africans who entered the urban azea prior to 1969 will wish 
to remain with a given employer while qualifying for permanent residence (this stopped 
in 1968). It is also pastly because Africans moving between jobs run the risk of 
being asked to leave the urban area if unemployed. 
This effect will be the smaller the smaller the proportion of contract 
workers in the labour force and the more the system is evaded. It is probable, 
however, that contract workers form a majority of the urban African work force. The 
1960 Census shows only 30 per cent of the indigenous urban African male labour force 
in the major metropolitan areas to be domiciled there - see Table 4. As for evasion, 
it is true that both African workers and employers have an incentive to evade the 
system. (10) Still, the hi& number of pass law convictions indicate a high risk to 
doing this - the number so convicted in 1960 equalled 14 per cent of the enumerated 
economically active African non-fm population. Moreover, the tinkering with the 
system, e.g. the "call-in cards1' introduced in 1968 to encourage contract workers 
repeatedly to return to the same employer, so making their training worthwhile, shows 
it to be "alive1q. 
The imposition of labour bureaux is likely to result in a once for all 
widening in the margin between skilled and unskilled pay in PMC, and lower 
fluctuations in unskilled pay over the cycle. The first effect results from limiting 
contract workers to a single job, so reducing their alternative wages from those 
prevailing for "permanent" Africans to those prevailing in the rural areas. The 
second is a result of less wage competition between employers. Instead of raising 
wages they will tend to %equisitionl' extra African labour from the bureaux when 
required. Both effects, as observed in movements of relative African pay, will be 
reinforced by the tendency of the "temporary sojomner" system to reduce the 
incentive to train and upgrade Africans. This, like the probable strengthening of 
the colour bar (see below), is likely to lower the relative skill composition of the 
African labour force and so relative average eaxnings. Also, because Africans are 
less likely to move up and down the occupational ladder over the cycle, there will be 
lower fluctuations in average African earnings ceteris paribus. 
There is a way of seeing whether influx control and a tighter colour bar 
since 1949 do affect the trend and movement of African wage rates in PMC, as suggested. 
This is to compare the behaviour of African earnings over the cycle in the period 
prior to 1949 with that afterwards. 
In fact, prior to 1949, we do find that African money earnings increase 
markedly faster when the economy is expanding, as indicated by a low level of white 
male unemployment (ll), and conversely. African earnings react not at all to the 
cycle after 1949 - see Table 5. It can be seen as well that the trend rate of 
increase in African earning8 is, as expected, somewhat lower after 194g9 though this 
is not statistically significant (the trend rate of increase in white earnings is, 
however, significantly higher, as will be seen). 
It is true that relationships of this sort are notoriously unstable, both 
with respect to the variables included and the time period covered. There is the 
problem as well of whether 1949 is the right year to partition the data. The best 
that can be said is that the results are consistent with the hypotheses, for which 
there is some other evidence from other sources. If our interpretation is correct, 
the wage gap will tend to widen with the introduction of labour bureaux, the widening 
perhaps being faster when the labour market is tight (because African workers are less 
able to take advantage of this) than when it is slack. 
Th& Colour Bar ancl Education Policy 
The colour bar, at least in industrial work, serves to reserve the higher 
paying, i.e. more skilled factory jobs, for whites. Outside mhing, however, it has 
varied over time. In the depression in the early thirties, the colour bar in PMC 
probably shifted downwards as whites took on unskilled jobs and Africans were shunted 
into the pool of unemployed. (12) Over the wax period it probably moved "upward". 
Evidence pointing to greater flexibility is the engineering unions' agreement to take 
on more apprentices (13) and the scarcity of white labour after perhaps 20 per cent of 
the white labour force (14) joined up. Moreover, during and immediately after the was 
there was an increase in relative African per pupil schooling expenditures - see 
Table 6 - and hence probably in their relative education levels and job opportunities. 
In the post-war period there has been, on the one hand, the pressure of 
prolonged,vigorous economic expansion which is likely to have led to pressures to 
upgrade Africans. On the other hand, there have been institutional changes designed 
to prevent this upgrading. On the pressures to upgrade, studies of business activity 
show that,apart from a short, shasp recession in 1949 there was continuous expansion 
from the beginning of the war until early in 1958. (151: hence, the continuing claims 
of a llshortage'Qof labour to perform skilled jobs. Thus a "shortage" of skilled 
labour in South Africa is nothing new. The situation seems to have been similar in 
the next upswing, which can be dated as lasting from early 1962 until mid-1967. 
In periods of prolonged economic expansion such as these, the supply of white 
labour for skilled jobs being inelastic, skilled wage rates are likely to rise 
markedly, leading to a cry of "shortage". We would then expect private employers to 
substitu-te against white labour by employing a greater proportion of unskilled labour 
and also by using African and other non-white labour in "white jobsf1, breaking the 
industrial colour bar. 
Working against this breach, however, was the introduction of strict influx 
control in 1949, then in 1951 the Bantu Building Workers Act, and in 1953 B& 
Education - marked by a large fall in funds for African pupils relative to white. 
Ln l956 job reservation was extended and in 1962 assisted white immiption, mainly 
of artisans (17)~ was begun. It is possible that these policies have successfully 
enabled the delimitation of fairly rigid. separate job categories for Africans, though 
less so for Coloureds and Asians. If this is true, then after 1949 i n  PMC African 
job opportunities will not have improved, despite expansion, and earnings of skilled 
workers - because they are in more inelastic supply - will have been pushed even 
higher. 
A way of checking these suggestions directly is to compare jobs which whites 
and Africans have taken at different points in time. Unfortunately, this is possible 
only between 1946 and 1960, a d  then only at the level of the major job categories. 
The picture is given in  Table 7. African relative representation increased in 
clerical and sales jobs, but as ~raftsmen/~rocess workers, as miners ancl as labourers 
remained constant. Weighting occupational proportions by income received by 
occupation (18) shows that Africans did tend to move into slightly higher paying 
occupations. But so did whites, so African occupational eomposition improved very 
little, if at all, relative to white over this period. 
An alternative, indirect, test rests on the proposition that if there has 
been increased sepasation of white and non-white spheres of work since 1949 white 
wage increases will have become more sensitive to the level of busliness activity. 
This is because prior to 1949 (say) the impact of a tight labour market on white 
average wage rates would be danped by the upgrading of non-whites, and conversely in 
slack years. After 1949, however, if it has proved less possible to promote Africans 
and, to a lesser extent, other non-whites (aqway a small proportion-of the urban 
labour force), this will tend to bid up the rate of increase of skilled money wage 
rates when the market is tight ceteris paribus. 011 the other hand, during slack 
periods, since the supply of labour to skilled jobs does not contract because non- 
whites are downgraded, skilled rates will increase at a slower rate. 
This is a possible interpretation of the difference pre- and post-1949 in 
the response of white average earnings rates in PMC to the level of unemployment 
revealed in the equation in Table 5. This equation is open to the same objection as 
the one for African earnings changes. Our interpretation is not, however, meant to 
stand or fall by itself, but rather to complement other findings (in this case) on 
apparent actual occupational shifts over time. Both sets of fragmentary evidence 
suggest that non-white, particularly African, and white spheres of work have become 
more rigidly delimited in the post-war period. This is a reason, additional to 
probable increasing skill margins consequent upon influx control, to expect the wage 
gap to have a tendency to widen since the war. 
The Earnings Gap in Mining and PMC 
With these concepts and facts in mind, look at Chart 1. Firstly, it can be 
seen that the gap is much higher in mining than PMC, even if we add 500/0 to African 
mine wages to allow for payments in kind. (19) Part of this difference is due to 
white labour being paid more on average in mining than PMC. This,presumably, reflects 
the arduousness of mining work. It could also reflect the stronger organization of 
whites on the mines - but if this were the case, the mines would not appear to suffer 
a shortage of white miners. (20) 
Most of the difference, however, is due to Africans easning less on average 
in mining than PMC. This is partly because Africans are more skilled in PMC. An 
indication of this is that in PMC in 1960 the median level of African education was 
1.2 years, in mining only 0.8 years. It is probably also because African mineworkers 
are paid less than Africans in comparable jobs in PMC. This is to be expected 
because Africans in mvIC have always had more freedom of action to put pressure on the 
authorities to raise wage rates. Moreover, most African mineworkers, no matter how 
skilled, have no alternative jobs - hence the African skill masgin in mining; is likely 
to be very compressed compared to that in PMC. An indication of the probable hi&er 
wages given the job, and the gmater prospects of promotion in PMC, is the marked 
tendency surveys have shown for Africans to tend to move out of mining into PMC.(21) 
That Africans cannot take advantage of this pay differential, so that it continues 
and has widened over time, reflects the operation of the influx control (and passport) 
system acting to prevent foreign and also (but probably less successfully) indigenous 
Africans moving into PMC. 
Secondly, it can be seen that the trend of the gap and movements about 
trend have differed between the two sectors. In mining, the gap has widened 
steadily, the only real interruption being its marked fall with the Mine Natives! 
Wages Commission award in 1944. Aftican miners! pay has been remarkably constant 
over time, indicating the restriction of their alternative earning opportunities owing 
to the pass laws, and the absence of minimum wage intervention. White miners! 
earnings have, however, risen strongly. The reason for this is likely to be that 
there is nothing to prevent them, over the longer term, moving out of the industry if 
their earnings rates are below those for similar work elsewhere. 
Different factors bear on the earnings gap in PMC. Here, as we have seen, 
there have probably been changes in the colour bar, in the impact of influx control, 
and in the pressure of minimum wage legislation. The most obvious movement of the 
gap is its large shrinkage during the war years. This can be ascribed to the higher 
wage minima and cost of living allowances set for Africans than for whites - probably 
a reflection of the vigorous wartime African Union movement - and relative upgrading 
of Africans during the wartime scarcity of white labour. 
In the strong expansion from mid-1932 to eaxly 1937, the gap widened 
slightly, but not nearly so strongly as it was to do in the post-war expansion. On 
our argument, this would be because increases in white average earnings rates were 
damped by the possibility - the colour bar not being as strong as later - of non-whites 
being moved up the job ladder. Another factor could be that African wage rates were 
bid up by employers, since African voluntary mobility was not then inhibited by the 
labour bureau laws. 
After the war there is a steady widening of the gap except for the period 
1958-9 to 1963. We would expect the enforcement of influx control to cause African 
wage rates to rise less in periods of economic expansion (which have generally 
characterized the post-war period) than they would otherwise. The possible 
strengthening of the colour bar would have the same effect. Moreover, it would, by 
making the supply of labour to skilled jobs more inelastic, cause white average 
e d g s  to rise faster in periods of expanison. 
Working against this has been minimum wage setting. The government seems 
continuously to have raised unskilled rates of pay from 1958 to 1964 or 65. This, 
plus th.e slower rate of increase of white average earnings in the recession of 1958- 
62 (the obverse of the increased inelasticity of the supply of skilled labour), is 
probably the main reason for the downward movement of the gap over most of this period. 
Perhaps the slackening of official upward pressures on African wages, itself a 
reflection of repression of African union and political activity, together with renewed 
economic expansion,explain the renewed upward trend of the gap after the mid-sixties. 
Looking briefly at the current period, the gap in mining appears to have 
peaked at nearly 20 in 1971 and then declined precipitously to reach about 11 in 1974. 
In PMC as well there has been a decline, with a value of around 6 for the gap in 
1971 and 5.5 in 1973. Using our framework, the main explanatory factor in mining is 
probably the need for increased competition with manufacturing for indigenous labour, 
given the cutback in foreign labour supplies. In manufacturing, the bportant factors 
are likely to be the strikes in Natal in 1973 and, more recently, in the Transvaal, 
which seem to have been accompanied by increased unionization and, as we would expect, 
a more active minimum wage policy. 
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Table h ,  . 
The IJunber of War* Determinations made yearly and 
a Their Approximate Coverage, by Colour, Republic 
1926 to 1967 
No. of Coverage (000' S) No. of 
Dets-made White Cal.+As. Af. Dets.made White Col.+As. Af.  
1951 6 e.2 1.7 6.6 
5 2 6 3.2 2.4 j .8 
5 3 2 51.3 8.8 33.1 
43 10 2.2 13.0 9.4 
44 6 1.6 0.6 10.6 Total number of Det.'s operat- 
45 8 3.8 10.4 25.9 ive and total coveraget- 
44 5 1 - 4  1.7 12.5 Dec. 
1967 125 116.6 hu.9 267.9 07 9 6 9 4.7 15.7 Industrial Council Agreements 
Sources: Social and Industrial Review, and Reports of the Department of 
Labour. 
Rotes a) The yearly change in the number of wage returns received from 
employees regulated by Wage Determinations is an approxima-t% measure of 
the coverage of the Determinations made in that year. 
b) The Wage Board was constituted 12 Feb. 1926.. 
c) 8 of these Determinations were inoperative as a result of 
various court judgements. 
d) The decrease in the coverage of Determinations was due to new 
i.e. Agreements coming into force, and some Determinations therefore being  
suspended. 
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Table 2 
Indices of Minimum Wages in MmufactuFng for General 
Labourers and Changes in Femd Prices, Republic, 1946 
General ~abourers~ 
Index Rate 'og 
Rand p.week Change 
Food Prices 
Rate of 
Change b 
Sources: Union Statistics for 50 years, South African Statistics 1964, 1966, 
1968, 1970. 
Notes: a. This index is an employment-weighted index of minimum wages for I 
'general labourers' tn the Leather, Rubber and Chemical industries, 
for which figures are published. This procedure follows Hume, op-cit.. l 
p. 220. l l 
b. Rates calculated as - x ~ - ~ )  /2xt, before rounding. 
Table 3 
The Number of Labour Bureaux and the  
Nrrmber of African Labourers Registered, 
se lected Years, 1949 t o  P971 
No. of Labour Bureaux Workers 
Registered (000) 
Local D i s t r i c t  'l'ribal 
1949-52 Bureaux set up voluntar i ly  by l oca l  au thor i t i es  
Sources: Various Reports of t he  Department of Bantu Administration and 
Development, and House of Assembly, Questions and Replies 
vol. 35, 1971, col. 385-6 and vo1.40, 1972, col .  250. 
Table 4 
Domicile of Indisenous, Economicallv Active, 
African Males Enumerated i n  14 Major Metro- 
po l i t an  Areas 
Domiciled in:- 
Towns i n  Other Bantu Other Total  Indigenous Foreign Workers 
M e t .  Area Towns Areas Areas Enumerated Enumerated 
Notes: Domicile is defined as 'the area  where permanent residence i s  s i tua ted1 .  
Source: 1960 Census. 
and Consauction 
Dependent Variable 
Rate of Change of Rate of Change of 
African earnings White earnings 
(% p.a.) (% p.a.) 
Constant: pre -19 49 
post-1949 
addition 
White male 
unemp. ra te :  Pre-1949 
( % I  
Rate of change of c.p.i. 
(% p.a.)  
Rate of change of food 
prices  (% p.a.) 
Real mfg. product per 
man ( ~ 1 0 0  (1938 prices) /m) 
Mfg. gross output t o  
wage xa t io  ($1 
D-W 
Notes: Periods pre-1949 period extends from 1926 t o  1948 excluding 1931-32 
and 1941-4 inclusive.  
post-1949 period extends from 1949 t o  1968. 
Lags a l l  independent variables a re  lagged 6 months except the 
labour productivity and p r o f i t  variables which a re  lagged l year. 
Specification - other specif icat ions  available on request. 
t r a t i o s  a re  i n  brackets. 
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Table 6 
White 
44 . 
Government Expenditure on Schooling, 
RepublicrSelected Years 1930 to 1970, 
- -  
Coloured or Asian African 
Ratio 
White/African 
Sources: b Departmental Committee on Native Ed,, U.G. 29/1936, para.302. 
a, C, e M. Horrell , A Decade of BanCu Education, Johannesburg, i s  k, 4 . 
d, f, M. Horrell, The Education of the Coloured Community, 
Johannesburg, r 3 '7 o . 
g House of Assembly, Questions and Replies, vol. 35, 1371, co1.817 
h S.A.I.R.R. Survey, 1972, p.44. 
j Ibid, p.44; figures refer to Coloureds and Asians respective1.y. 
--Table 7 . 
Oc=cu?a.tiong af Employed Males of Specified Occupation i n  the Civilian 
W .- 
Non-Farm Population, Republic, 1946 and 1960, 
6 A 
Proportions, L~J/LJ 
tTiite Coloured Asian Mri c m  
Clerical - 9.8 18.3 "8 3-2. 3-0 8.9 -4  
.. 
1-1 
Sales - Wg, Prp4.9 2.5 . -5 . ,5 13.8 9.1 -6 -4 
Other '4,7 5-7 2.9 3.3 16.3. ,15,6 6 1.3 
. Cr&Ssinzn ] 33.0 33.1 29.9 30.7 26.3 27.1 3-6 4-6 Process W, 
Service klr, 6.6 6.1 13.8. 8.0 15.0 13-5 19.6 13.6 
B 
Proportions Relative t o  Total Labour Force ( ~ i  j/L j )/(L j /~)  
. - 
k.hi t e  Coloured Asian African 
Professional 2.7 2.6. ' ' - 7  -8 .S 1;O W 3 - 3  
Managerial . 3.3 3.1 . 1 -3 . 5 1.1 .l -1 
clerical ' 3.2 2.9 . -2 . 6 1.0 1-4 -1 - -2 
Sales-k!g Prop. -2.6 2.0 ' . 3 rL! 7.3 7.3 .l W 3 
Other 2.0 1-8 1.3 1.1 7-0 5.0 2 9 4 
Miner 3.5 3.5 l . ,,l CO . 0 e 0 -0 
Craftsrxz? 1 2.3 2.2 2-0 2.0 1-8 . 1.8 .3 e 3 Process Wr) 
Service Wr. P 4 ~5 -9 . "7  $.O 1,2 1.3 1 3 
-. d- 
-- 
Sources: Bureau of Census and Statistics, 
Vol. V, and various tables. 
Notes Occ'upational titles for  the 1946 Census defined according to the 
International Standard Class i f icat ioh of-Occupations (I.L.O., Geneva, 
1958) . a s  used An the 1960 Census. 

